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A death penalty provision for terrorists who murder is long
overdue. In 1989, the Senate overwhelmingly passed legislation that
I sponsored to authorize the death penalty for terrorists who murder
United States nationals abroad. This legislation was eventually ex-
cised by a House-Senate Conference that hammered out final pas-
sage of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1990.1 Most recently, on
February 20, 1991, the Senate once again passed terrorist death pen-
alty legislation. This amendment to the Omnibus Export Amend-
ments Act of 1991 also includes domestic terrorist murders. As of
this writing, that legislation is awaiting action in the House of
Representatives.
Passage of a death penalty law will send the clear message that
the United States will deal swiftly and harshly with terrorists. The
1970s and 1980s witnessed a rash of terrorist acts abroad. When
captured, those terrorists were virtually patted on the back for their
heinous acts. Often they received light sentences. Foreign countries
shielded them from prosecution. These countries either sought to
curry political favor with the responsible groups or were simply in-
timidated. Consider these illustrations:
- On March 1, 1973, Palestinian gunmen, belonging to the
Black September Organization, burst into the Saudi Arabia Em-
bassy in Khartoum, Sudan, during a reception. When their de-
mands were not met, they seized, and then murdered, United
States Embassy Counselor George Curtis Moore, United States
Ambassador Cleo A. Noel, Jr. and Belgian Charge d'Affaires
Guy Eid.3 A Sudanese court tried and sentenced the terrorists to
* R.-Pennsylvania. Senator Specter is a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the
Appropriations Committee, and the Veterans' Affairs Committee.
Thomas N. Dahdouh, Minority Counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommit-
tee on the Constitution, assisted in the preparation of this article.
1. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990).
2. S. 320, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The Senate passed this amendment on Feb. 26,
1991.
3. Korn, We Will Not Pay Blackmail: The Khartoum Murders and U.S. Policy on Ter-
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life in prison. President Nimeiry then reduced the sentences to
seven years and sent the terrorists to serve that time with the
Palestine Liberation Office in Cairo.
4
* In 1977, Abu Daoud was arrested in Paris for coordinat-
ing the murder of eleven Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic
games in Munich. He was released four days later to be de-
ported to Algeria, where he received a hero's welcome. 6
- 7 In 1985, Italy released, without explanation, Moham-
med Abul Abbas, the suspected mastermind of the Achille
Lauro hijacking and murder of an American passenger, Leon
Klinghoffer.'
Terrorist acts against Americans abroad during Operation De-
sert Storm and Operation Desert Shield caused American military
installations, both at home and abroad, to increase security precau-
tions as terrorist incidents rose to alarming levels.7 Despite increased
security precautions, from January 18 to March 24, 1991, the State
Department documented hundreds of significant security incidents.8
In particular, on February 7, 1991, gunmen assassinated a retired
American serviceman who was employed at an air base in Adana,
Turkey.9 This base was used for bombing raids on Iraq. Again,
shortly after Allied forces defeated the Iraqi forces, an American
military employee in Turkey was shot execution-style. 10
Some foreign countries, however, have demonstrated an inabil-
ity to confront the terrorist threat. As our forces fought a leader who
unleashed terrorist actions against Israeli and Saudi Arabian civil-
ians, two Palestinians convicted in the Achille Lauro hijacking were
released early from jail and expelled from Italy."1 Justice was not
rorism, FOREIGN SERVICE J. 28 (Feb. 1991).
4. Id. at 31.
5. The French may have yielded to political pressure and fear of reprisals. Hannay, The
Legislative Approach to the Political Offense Exception, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNA-
TIONAL TERRORISM: U.S. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 115, 116 n.5 (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1988) [here-
inafter Bassiouni, TERRORISM].
6. PLO Leader Slips From U.S. Grasp in Italy; U.S. Protests Abbas' Departure After
Issue of Arrest Warrant, Wash. Post, Oct. 13, 1985, at Al, col. 3.
7. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1991, at A9, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1991, at A1S, col. 1;
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT REPORT, TECHNOL-
OGY AGAINST TERRORISM: THE FEDERAL EFFORT-SUMMARY (1990).
8. These lists are on file with the Dickinson Law Review.
9. American Is Slain in Turkey, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1991, at All, col. 1.
10. American is Slain in Turkey; Leftist Group Cites Gulf Link, N.Y. Times, March
23, 1991, at 5, col. 1.
11. Terrorists Get Early Release, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1991, at All, col. 5. These ter-
rorists were Issa Abbas, a cousin of the fugitive Palestine Liberation Front leader Abul Abbas,
and Youssef Saad. Abbas received a seven year sentence in 1986, while Saad received a six
year term. They were released from prison on Christmas Eve under a law allowing a two year
reduction during the Christmas season.
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served. A terrorist death penalty law will show individuals that acts
of international terrorism against the United States will not go
unpunished.
Despite the need for a terrorist death penalty, some of my col-
leagues have voiced arguments against such legislation. Some ques-
tion whether the legislation has a sufficiently precise definition of ter-
rorism, especially when the proposed legislation was expanded to
include domestic acts of terrorism. Others wonder whether terrorists
who are motivated by ideological and religious fervor would be de-
terred by a death penalty law. Finally, some question whether such
legislation will increase problems in extraditing criminals to the
United States for trial.
This article begins with an analysis of the evolution of legisla-
tion regarding a death penalty provision for terrorists. Part III con-
siders the definitional obstacle present in enacting suitable legisla-
tion. Part IV discusses the deterrent effect that death penalty
legislation will have on violent terrorist acts. In Part V, the potential
problem of extradition is considered in light of death penalty legisla-
tion. This article concludes by advocating the adoption of terrorist
death penalty legislation.
II. Evolution of Terrorist Death Penalty Legislation
On July 11, 1985, I introduced the Terrorist Prosecution Act
(S. 1429).12 This legislation would criminalize, under United States
law, terrorist attacks upon American nationals abroad. On February
19, 1986, the Senate unanimously passed S. 1429.18 This provision
became law as part of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and An-
titerrorism Act of 1986.1" The law creates extraterritorial federal ju-
12. 131 CONG. REc. 18870-71 (July 11, 1985) [hereinafter S. 1429].
13. 132 CONG. REc. 2355-60 (Feb. 19, 1986).
14. Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 896, § 1201(a) (1986). At the end of the 101st Con-
gress, Congress passed the Anti-terrorism Act of 1990, which added a civil remedy of treble
damages for acts of international terrorism. Pub. L. No. 101-519, 104 Stat. 2240, 2250-53, §
132 (1990). This public law, which was co-sponsored by Senator Charles Grassley (R.-Iowa)
and myself, recodified the criminal provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2331 as 18 U.S.C. § 2332, while
leaving them substantively unchanged. It was later discovered that the House-Senate Confer-
ees intended that the Anti-terrorism Act be deleted from Pub. L. No. 101-59, but the Act was
accidentally left in by a clerk and was signed by the President. See 136 CONG. REc. S2500-05
(daily ed. Feb. 28, 1991) (remarks of Senators Byrd (D.-W.Va.), Heinz (R.-Pa.), Specter, and
Grassley). Consequently, the Act was repealed on April 10, 1991 by H.R. 1281, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess., P.L. 102-27, 105 Stat. 130, 155, § 402. However, the Senate has passed the Act
again, see 136 CONG. REC. S4511-12 (daily ed. April 16, 1991), and there is every reason to
believe that the House of Representatives will follow suit, so that the Act will once again
become law. Thus, throughout this article, I will refer to the provisions of Chapter 113A of
Title 18 as if the Anti-Terrorism Act were still in force.
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risdiction for specific terrorist acts, including: (1) the murder, volun-
tary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter of a United States
national outside the United States; (2) attempts or conspiracies to
kill a United States national abroad; and (3) physical violence
outside the United States committed with intent to cause serious
bodily injury or which results in serious bodily injury to a United
States national."' Paragraph (a) of the section covers homicide. It
provides:
(a) HOMICIDE.-Whoever kills a national of the United
States, while such national is outside the United States, shall-
(1) if the killing is a murder as defined in section
1111 (a) of this title, be fined under this title or impris-
oned for any term of years or for life, or both so fined
and so imprisoned;
(2) if the killing is a voluntary manslaughter as defined
in section 1112(a) of this title, be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and
(3) if the killing is an involuntary manslaughter as de-
fined in section 1112(a) of this title, be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.1"
The statute also provides that prosecutions are not to be undertaken
unless the Attorney General, or the "highest ranking subordinate of
the Attorney General with responsibility for criminal prosecutions,"
certifies, in writing, that in his or her judgment the "offense was
intended to coerce, intimidate or retaliate against a government or a
civilian population.
'17
Even at the time of the original passage of S. 1429, I envisioned
adding a provision allowing the death penalty for other crimes com-
mitted by terrorists. On July 26, 1985, I introduced S. 1508 to au-
thorize the death penalty for terrorists who commit first-degree mur-
der.1 Again in the 101st Congress, I introduced S. 36 to provide the
death penalty for terrorist murder, as well as for other criminal
acts.19 I also offered the terrorist death-penalty provision, this time
15. See George, Federal Anti-Terrorist Legislation, in Bassiouni, TERRORISM, supra
note 5, at 31-33 (providing comprehensive analysis of this statute and other antiterrorist
statutes).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
17. Id. § 2332(d) (as recodified from 18 U.S.C. § 2331(e) by Pub. L. No. 101-519, 104
Stat. 2240, 2250, § 132(b)(1) (1990)).
18. I planned to add it to S. 1429 when that legislation reached the Senate floor. How-
ever, in the interest of ensuring smooth passage of S. 1429, I did not pursue this avenue. 131
CONG. REC. 20779-81 (July 26, 1985).
19. 135 CONG. REC. 114-18 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989).
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standing alone, as an amendment to the 1990 Foreign Relations Au-
thorization Act on July 19, 1989.20 I withheld pushing for that
amendment after the Majority Leader agreed to schedule a vote on
the terrorist-death penalty legislation for later that year.2 1 The ter-
rorist-death penalty provision, introduced as S. 1798, a free-standing
bill, was taken up in the Senate for a vote on October 26, 1989.22
Senate Bill 1798 (S. 1798) was limited to murders of United
States nationals abroad. It simply added a phrase to the paragraph
dealing with murder, paragraph (1) of now-subsection of 2332(a).
That paragraph in turn referred to 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (a) for the defi-
nition of first-degree murder.2" S. 1798, if enacted into law, would
have added a phrase that the court "may impose a sentence of death
in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 7001 of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (21 U.S.C. § 848)."24
During the debate on S. 1798,26 Senator Joseph Biden, Chair-
man of Senate Judiciary Committee, pointed out that S. 1798 could
also be read to refer to second-degree murder since section 111 (a)
defines first-degree murder as:
Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other
kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing;
or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate,
any arson, rape, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated from a pre-
meditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death
of any human being other than him who is killing, is murder in
the first degree."6
Section 1111 (a) proceeds, however, to state that "[a) ny other mur-
der is murder in the second degree."2 Thus, S. 1798's reference to
section 1111 (a) was, without more, insufficient to indicate that the
death penalty was meant to apply solely to first-degree murder. The
ambiguity was clarified and replaced with the following:
(1)(A) if the killing is a first degree murder as defined in section
1111 (a) of this title, be punished by death or imprisonment for
any term of years or for life, or be fined under this title, or both;
20. Amend. 325 to S. 1160, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S8290 (daily ed.
July 19, 1989).
21. 135 CONG. REc. 8402-08 (daily ed. July 20, 1989).
22. 135 CONG. REC. 14205-31 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1989).
23. S. 1798, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
24. Id.
25. 135 CONG. REC. 14218-20 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1989)(remarks of Sen. Biden, D.-
Del.).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 111l(a) (1988).
27. Id.
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(B) if the killing is a murder other than a first degree murder as
defined in section 1111 (a) of this title, be fined under this title
or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both so fined
and so imprisoned.s
With this change making it clear that the death penalty would only
apply to first-degree murder, this legislation passed overwhelmingly
by a vote of seventy-nine to twenty.
29
On January 23, 1991, as the 102d Congress convened, I intro-
duced the Terrorist Death Penalty Act of 1991 (S. 245).30 S. 245
was nearly identical to S. 1798 except for a few changes. For exam-
ple, in S. 245, I incorporated the careful and exhaustive procedural
aspects of the death penalty provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1988 into the bill itself. These provisions are designed to ensure
that counsel for a defendant meet minimum standards: five years of
membership in the bar and three years experience litigating felony
cases in federal courts. The bill retained an exclusion for defendants
under age eighteen at the time of the crime, the mentally retarded,
and the mentally disabled. Another change, designed to make clear
that only the most egregious acts of terrorism would result in the
death sentence, required the government to prove beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that the murder constituted first-degree murder, and that
the defendant:
(A) intentionally killed the victim;
(B) intentionally participated in an act, contemplating that the
life of a person would be taken or intending that lethal force
would be used in connection with a person, other than one of the
participants in the offense, and the victim died as a direct result
of the act; or
(C) acting with reckless disregard for human life, engaged or
substantially participated in conduct which the defendant knew
28. 135 CONG. REC. S14230 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1989).
29. Id. Consideration of this legislation was included in the House-Senate Conference on
the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1990, convened in the waning days of the 101st Congress
in October 1990. Because of the press of time and the conferees' inability to come to agree-
ment on several controversial issues - not only the death penalty for terrorists but provisions
for the death penalty for many other crimes, habeas corpus reform, and a ban on assault
weapons - all controversial provisions of the legislation, including the provision for a death
penalty for terrorist-murderers, were excised from the final version. Crime Bill: Tough Talk,
Weak Action, Newsday, Oct. 30, 1990, at 17.
30. I requested an early scheduling of a vote on the legislation because of the threat of
terrorist incidents during Operation Desert Storm. 137 CONG. REc. S1069-82 (daily ed. Jan.
23, 1991). My colleague from Pennsylvania, Congressman George Gekas (R.-Pa), introduced
this legislation in the House of Representatives as H.R. 639, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 24,
1991).
TERRORIST DEATH PENALTY
would create a grave risk of death to another person or persons
and death resulted from such conduct . . .
On February 19, 1991, I offered a modified version of S. 245 as
an amendment to the Omnibus Export Amendments Act of 1991.32
Because of concerns expressed by Senator Strom Thurmond that do-
mestic acts of terrorism should be included in the legislation,3 S the
bill was changed, adding the death penalty for terrorists who murder
individuals inside the United States."' Indeed, domestic acts of ter-
rorism, although fortunately infrequent, are as grave a danger as ter-
rorist acts abroad. The following provide examples of recent terrorist
acts that have occurred within our borders: (1) the car bombing of
Orlando Letelier, ambassador of the former Chilean Government of
Salvador Allende Gossens, and Ronni Moffitt, a United States citi-
zen, on September 21, 1976 on Washington's Embassy Row; 35 (2)
the 1989 car bombing of Sharon Rogers', wife of the Navy Captain
whose vessel accidentally shot down an Iranian civilian airliner;$'
and (3) the bombing of the United States Senate in 1983.1" Further-
more, other acts of domestic violence potentially fall under the ru-
bric of terrorism: the murder of Jewish activist Meir Kahane in New
York City in 1990 and the murder of Arab-American activist Alex
Odeh in California in 1985.38
Accordingly, the modified amendment would read as follows:
(a) HOMICIDE.-Whosever kills a person while such person is
inside the United States, or kills a national of the United
States, while such national is outside the United States, shall-
(1)(a) if the killing is a first degree murder as defined
in section 1111 (a) of this title, be punished by death or
imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or both
31. S. 245, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S1069-82 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1991).
32. Amend. 3 to S. 320, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S1902-03 (daily ed.
Feb. 19, 1991).
33. 137 CONG. REC. S1905 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond, R.-
S.C.).
34. 137 CONG. REC. S1902-03 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1991).
35. Chile Agrees to Pay Reparations to U.S. in Slaying of Envoy, N.Y. Times, May 13,
1990, at 1, col. 6.
36. Personal Vendetta Is Seen as the Motive for Bombing of Van, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2,
1989, at B 11, col. 6; Blast Wrecks Van of Skipper Who Downed Iran Jet, N.Y. Times, March
11, 1989, at 1, col. 2; see also S. Res. 214, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S16106
(daily ed. Nov. 20, 1989) (A resolution calling for a reward for the arrest of individuals re-
sponsible for the bombing of Sharon Rogers' car).
37. Capitol Security Is Tightened After Bombing, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1983, at Al,
col. 4.
38. Suspect in Kahane Slaying Kept List of Prominent Jews, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1990,
at 29, col. 5; Israel Holds Couple Sought by U.S. Since 1989 in Letter-Bomb Killing, N.Y.
Times, March 26, 1991, at A13, col. 2.
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so fined and so imprisoned; and
(b) if the killing is a murder other than a first degree
murder as defined in section 1111(a) of this title, be
fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of
years or for life, or both so fined and so imprisoned
SB
The addition of domestic acts of terrorism created the need for
a definition of terrorism in the statute itself. As the statute now
reads, the Attorney General need only certify that the offense "was
intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a
civilian population. 14 ° As will be explained shortly, 41 however, there
was a concern that a definition of terrorism that was too narrow
would unduly restrict prosecutors. Consequently, during Senate de-
bate in February 1991, a compromise was reached whereby the first
portion of section 2332(a) would be changed as follows:
(a) HOMICIDE.-
(A) Whoever kills a person, with the intent to commit
an act of terrorism, which is any act which appears to
be intended to intimidate, retaliate against or coerce a
civilian population; to influence the policy of a govern-
ment by intimidation, retaliation or coercion; or to af-
fect the conduct of a government by assassination, kid-
napping, hostage-taking or other violent act, while such
victim is inside the United States; or
(B) Whoever kills a national of the United States, while
such national is outside the United States; shall .... 41
After a motion to table the amendment failed, the amendment
passed by voice vote. 48 The Omnibus Export Amendments Act of
1990 passed by the Senate by voice vote later that same day and, as
of this writing, is awaiting action by the House of Representatives.
III. The Definition of Terrorism
Definitional problems plague legislation on terrorism. As Robert
A. Friedlander, former Minority Chief Counsel of the Senate For-
39. Amend. 3 to S. 320, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S1921-23 (daily ed.
Feb. 19, 1991) (modifications to S. 245 are italicized). Other modifications to S. 245 deleted
provisions that excluded the death penalty for the mentally retarded and the mentally disabled.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2332(d) (as recodified from 18 U.S.C. § 2331(e) by Pub. L. No. 101-
519, 104 Stat. 2240, 2250, § 132(b)(1) (1990)).
41. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
42. 137 CONG. REC. S1948 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1991).
43. Id.
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eign Relations Committee, notes, "definition is the rock upon which
many anti-terrorism legislative proposals have foundered."", When I
first introduced S. 1429 in 1985, the definition of terrorism contained
in the bill was the only definition of terrorism in the United States
Code.4" That definition found in the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act (FISA) of 1978, 4" defined "international terrorism" to
mean activities that:
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that
are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of
any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed
within the jurisdiction of the United States or any State;
(2) appear to be intended-
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a government by in-
timidation or coercion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by assas-
sination or kidnapping; and
(3) occur totally outside the United States, or transcend na-
tional boundaries in terms of the means by which they are ac-
complished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intim-
idate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek
asylum.'
7
The Justice Department, which opposed the incorporation into law of
any terrorism definition, persuaded the Judiciary Committee's Sub-
committee on Security and Terrorism to remove the FISA definition
from S. 1429."0 When S. 1429 reached the floor, it had no definition
of terrorism. Senator Hatch noted that some definition was neces-
sary.49 Before the legislation was passed by the full Congress, a pro-
vision was inserted to provide that
[n]o prosecution for any offense described . . . shall be under-
taken except on written certification of the Attorney General or
the highest ranking subordinate of the Attorney General with
responsibility for criminal prosecutions that . . . such offense
was intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a govern-
44. R. Friedlander, The U.S. Legislative Approach, in Bassiouni, TERRORISM, supra
note 5, at 11.
45. Last year, the President signed into law the Anti-terrorism Act of 1990, see supra
note 14. That Act uses the definition of international terrorism found in the FISA. See Pub. L.
No. 101-519, 104 Stat. 2240, 2250, § 132(b)(2) (1990) (creating newly-codified section
2331(l) defining "international terrorism").
46. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (1988).
47. Id.
48. Friedlander, supra note 44, at 18.
49. 132 CoNG. REc. 2359 (Feb. 19, 1986) (remarks of Sen. Hatch, R.-Utah).
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ment or a civilian population. 50
This compromise recognized the President's broad, albeit not unlim-
ited, constitutional authority in foreign policy"' by giving him needed
flexibility in determining which violent acts constitute terrorist inci-
dents. At the same time, it also constrained the Executive's discre-
tion by including a sufficiently circumscribed definition of terrorism.
The Justice Department argued that a definition of terrorism
would place the government, at trial, in the awkward and embarrass-
ing position of having to explore and explain the defendant terrorist's
cause. But as Friedlander has pointed out, this argument loses
much of its persuasiveness in the case of first-degree murder prose-
cutions. For first-degree murder, the government has the burden of
proving motive in order. to establish the essential elements of pre-
meditation and malice aforethought, and thus it must delve into the
defendant terrorist's cause regardless.5" Certainly, whether or not
there is a definition of terrorism in the statute, the government must
show that the terrorist believed in a cause and acted pursuant to
those beliefs.
The government, in particular the State Department, also ar-
gued that codification of a definition of terrorism would make it al-
most impossible to negotiate international agreements on terrorism.
It further argued that the Executive needed flexibility in determining
which acts of violence abroad were terrorist incidents. 4 Friedlander
rejects this argument as "wooly-headed thinking" that is "exactly
the kind of mind-set which makes possible the absurd notion that
one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter."55 Al-
though I understand these criticisms, I believe that the compromise
reached on S. 1429 was the best possible result under the circum-
stances: it incorporated a sufficiently precise definition of terrorism,
while recognizing the President's constitutional powers to regulate
foreign affairs.
These definitional concerns were again brought to the forefront
when the terrorist death penalty amendment to the Omnibus Export
Amendments Act of 1991 was modified to cover domestic acts of
50. 18 U.S.C. I 2332(d) (as recodified from 18 U.S.C. § 2331(e) by Pub. L. No. 101-
519, 104 Stat. 2240, 2250, § 132(b)(1) (1990)).
51. See United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1936);
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
52. Friedlander, supra note 44, at 11-12.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 12-13.
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terrorism. Since section 2332 left the decision of whether an offense
constituted an act of terrorism to Attorney General, or his subordi-
nates, Senator Metzenbaum rose to question whether the death pen-
alty could now apply to any domestic act of violence:
D[o] I understand that this whole measure . . . has to do with
terrorism, and yet we do not have terrorism defined in any place
that I can find? But what we do have is . . . the judgment of
the . . . Attorney General, or a subordinate, to prove that the
offense was intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against
the Government or civilian population ..... [Y]ou could very
well have somebody go into a school yard and mow down a
number of children, as we know happened in [California]. Or
you could have somebody with an Uzi or one of these semi-auto-
matic guns mow down a number of police officers who were
meeting in a group, or a group of civilians. And the question
that I have is, when is a terrorist a terrorist? And does the fact
the Attorney General or his subordinate - does his certification
that the offense was intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate
against the Government or civilian population make the defend-
ant a terrorist per se?51
Senator Metzenbaum raises a meritorious point. Without a definition
of terrorism, the legislation could apply a federal death penalty to
common acts of domestic violence that would be more appropriately
the province of state law enforcement officials. Moreover, section
2332 left to the Attorney General the decision of what constituted a
terrorist incident, primarily in recognition of the constitutional au-
thority granted to the President to regulate foreign policy. No such
deference is accorded the President in the area of domestic criminal
violence.
On the other hand, proponents of a more restrictive definition
may go too far in unduly restricting federal prosecutors from seeking
the death penalty for actual terrorist acts occurring in the United
States. For example, the Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Act of
1991, a bill introduced by Senator Biden, limits the death penalty
for domestic terrorism to acts by "agents of a foreign power," a defi-
nition derived from the FISA 7 That definition, however, excludes
56. 137 CONG. REC. S1947 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum, D.-
Ohio).
57. S. 266, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1201; 137 CONG. REC. Si 190-96 (daily ed. Jan. 24,
1991) (employing definition of agent of a foreign power from FISA for criminal provisions on
domestic terrorism). The definition of "agent of a foreign power" in FISA is codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1801(b) (1988), and states that an agent of a foreign power is:
(1) any person other than a United States person, who-
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acts of terrorism conducted by indigenous terrorist groups not con-
nected to a foreign power.58 There have been several acts of domestic
terrorism committed by wholly-domestic terrorist groups. For exam-
ple, the 1983 bombing of the Capitol building was conducted by a
group of militant members of the Black Liberation Army with no
connection to any foreign power.5 9 This definition would also exclude
Puerto Rican nationalist groups, like the clandestine Fuerzas Arma-
das de Liberacion Nacional (F.A.L.N.) and the terrorists who
sprayed the House of Representatives floor with gunfire in 1954,
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign
power, or as a member of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(4)
of this section;
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engaged in clandestine
intelligence activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the
United States, when the circumstances of such person's presence in the
United States indicate that such person may engage in such activities in
the United States, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any per-
son in the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any per-
son to engage in such activities; or
(2) any person who-
(A) knowingly engaged in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for
or on behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a
violation of the criminal statute of the United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a
foreign power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence
activities for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve
or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United
States;
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage, or international terrorism, or activi-
ties that are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power;
or
(D) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct or activities de-
scribed in subparagraphs (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with
any person to engage in activities described in subparagraphs (A), (B), or
(C).
58. Although 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(C) (1988) refers to persons engaging in "interna-
tional terrorism," any possibility that this language is not strictly limited to individuals com-
mitting acts of terrorism on behalf of a foreign power or foreign-based terrorist group is
clearly foreclosed by the language restricting it to acts "for or on behalf of a foreign power." It
is also foreclosed by the fact that the definition of "international terrorism" in section
1801(c)(3) limits it to activities "occurring totally outside the United States, or transcending
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the person they
appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which the perpetrators operate or seek
asylum." See also S. REP. No. 604, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3973, 3995-96 ("The rare case might arise where a U.S. person is
acting for or on behalf of a foreign-based terrorist group that is substantially composed of U.S.
persons. In such a case, the judge must examine the circumstances carefully in order to deter-
mine whether the organization[] is a foreign-based terrorist group and not a domestic group
with some foreign aspects to it."); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1720, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3904, 4049.
59. Terms Levied in Bombings of Government Buildings; 'Freedom Fighters' Given Ad-
ditional Ten Years, Wash. Post, Nov. 17, 1990, at B4, col. 1; Capitol Security Is Tightened
After Bombing, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1983, at A2, col. 4.
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wounding and killing several Members of Congress.60 Just as impor-
tantly, there are many kinds of hate groups, like the Ku Klux Klan
and Aryan Nation, which fall into a "gray" area: many Americans
would justifiably consider them to be terrorist groups. Finally, the
definition of "agent of a foreign power" may not cover terrorists
committing acts who, although motivated by support of foreign
forces, have insufficient connection with a foreign-based group.
Faced with this problem, a compromise was reached with Sena-
tors Biden and Thurmond. The compromise required that, for do-
mestic acts of terrorism only, the government must also prove that
the offender committed the killing
with the intent to commit an act of terrorism, which is any act
which appears to be intended to intimidate, retaliate against or
coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a govern-
ment by intimidation, retaliation or coercion; or to affect the
conduct of a government by assassination, kidnapping, hostage-
taking or other violent act.61
Under this definition, the prosecution would have to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the domestic act of violence was intended to
be an act of terrorism. This would be in addition to the requirement
in section 2332(d) that the Attorney General certify that the acts
committed were acts of terrorism.
Therefore, the decision of whether the act constituted an act of
terrorism is placed before a jury. Under this definition, prosecutors
receive sufficient flexibility to prosecute domestic varieties of terror-
ism, without giving them carte blanche for prosecuting violent acts
that are simply not terrorist-inspired.
IV. Deterrent Effect on Terrorists
Based on many years of experience as a prosecutor, I believe
that the death penalty has a general deterrent effect on violent
crime, including terrorism. The evidence amassed by California Su-
preme Court Justice McComb in his dissent in People v. Love6" is
very persuasive. This evidence demonstrates that, on a number of
occasions, criminals were deterred from committing more violent
acts because they feared the death penalty.
Three examples illustrate this proposition. Margaret Elizabeth
60. Chicago Tribune, Aug. 8, 1985, Temp Sec. at i, Zone C; Guerrillas, Reuters New-
swire Service, April 11, 1980 (NEXIS, Archives files).
61. 137 CONG. REc. S1948 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1991).
62. 56 Cal. 2d 720, 363 P.2d 33, 16 Cal. Rptr. 777, 784 (1961).
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Daly was arrested on August 28, 1961 for assaulting an individual
with a knife. She told investigating officers: "Yeh, I cut him and I
should have done a better job. I would have killed him but I didn't
want to go to the gas chamber."6 Louis Joseph Turck did not carry
a gun on a robbery as he had in the past because, "I knew that if I
used a real gun and that if I shot someone in a robbery, I might get
the death penalty and go to the gas chamber."64 Orelius Matthew
Stewart was arrested on March 3, 1960 for attempted bank robbery.
He later stated: "The officer who had arrested me was by himself,
and if I had wanted, I could have blasted him. I thought about it at
the time, but I changed my mind when I thought of the gas cham-
ber."65 These cases, and many more like them, demonstrate that the
death penalty does have deterrent effect on violent crimes.
Some Senators, however, have questioned whether imposition of
the death penalty for terrorist-murderers would have any deterrent
effect. Many argue that terrorists are motivated by fanaticism and
would not be deterred by the death penalty. This point was made by
Senator Hatfield during the 1989 debate on the death penalty
legislation:
There are those who claim that a death penalty for terrorists
will deter future terrorist acts. Deterrence, however, presupposes
rational conduct on the part of the person to be deterred. Ter-
rorists, calculating as they may be, are fanatics who are not
afraid to die - and members of terrorist organizations view
their comrades who die in support of the cause as martyrs. Exe-
cution of terrorists in this country will only serve to give terrorist
organizations the publicity they so ravenously seek - and offer
martyrdom as a reward for their brutality. In fact, Mr. Presi-
dent, it is all together possible that the execution of terrorists
will increase acts of terror rather than stop them.66
Concededly, some terrorists are clearly suicidal; nothing will de-
ter them. This criticism, however, does not recognize the considera-
ble evidence that terrorists often receive light sentences and that
would-be terrorists know that their groups will see to it that they will
be freed. Would-be terrorists know that Abu Daoud, Mohammed
Abul Abbas, the terrorists who killed the United States Ambassador
to the Sudan, and, most recently, several hijackers of the Achille
63. 16 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 135 CONG REC. S14212-13 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield, R.-
Oregon).
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Lauro, for all practical purposes, got off scot-free.67
There is evidence that, even without a death penalty for viola-
tions of United States anti-terrorism laws, these laws have a deter-
rent effect. Terrorists fear extradition to the United States precisely
because justice in United States courts is decisive and swift. For ex-
ample, after Sheik Obeid was captured in Lebanon by the Israelis in
1989, he told his captors that he was "terrified" of being extradited
to the United States for the murder of American hostages in Leba-
non. This was because the United States would not bend to political
pressure and would exact swift punishment. 68 The terror is not imag-
inary. As long as even one terrorist is dissuaded from attacking an
American because of the death penalty statute, the statute will have
saved precious lives.
Critics fail to recognize that the imposition of the death penalty
for a terrorist would remove that individual as a target for release
through further terrorist acts. 9 For example, the terrorists who held
hostage the United States Ambassador to the Sudan did so in order
to obtain the release of Sirhan Sirhan, the killer of Senator Robert
Kennedy, and Abu Daoud, a PLO operative in jail in Jordan. 0
Many, if not most, of the hostages currently held in Lebanon, plausi-
bly were seized in order to trade for the release of Shiite terrorists
held in jail in Kuwait.7
1
Finally, regardless of its deterrent value, the death penalty for
terrorists expresses our society's moral revulsion toward terrorism. In
Gregg v. Georgia,2 Justice Potter Stewart, joined by Justice Powell
and Justice Stevens, wrote as follows: "Indeed, the decision that cap-
ital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is
an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are
themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate
response may be the penalty of death. '7 3 He continued: "[C]apital
punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at particu-
larly offensive conduct. This function may be unappealing to many,
67. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text (describing terrorist acts for which per-
petrators were not held accountable under law).
68. Israelis Report Sheik Told Them.Marine Was Still Alive Last Week, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 3, 1989, at A2, col. 2.
69. Bassiouni, A Policy-Oriented Inquiry of "International Terrorism", in Bassiouni,
TERRORISM, supra note 5, at xiv.
70. Korn, supra note 3, at 28.
71. The release of the Shiite terrorists after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, however, has
not yet led to the release of American hostages in Lebanon. Islamic Jihad Repeats Offer to
Trade U.S. Hostages for 17 Jailed Muslims, L.A. Times, Oct. 25, 1989, at A8, col. 5.
72. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
73. Id. at 184.
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but it is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely
on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs. '74
Passage of a death penalty law will send a clear message to ter-
rorists: the United States will punish terrorists swiftly and invoke the
death penalty when appropriate.
V. Extradition of Terrorists to the United States
Another potential problem that death penalty opponents raise is
that a death penalty law for terrorists would complicate extradition
of terrorists to the United States. During the October 1989 debate
on the terrorist death penalty legislation, Senator Kennedy noted
that extradition treaties currently in effect with twenty countries per-
mit those countries to refuse to extradite criminals, unless the coun-
try requesting extradition refuses to seek the death penalty. 75
When a country refuses to extradite a criminal unless the
United States agrees not to seek the death penalty, the United States
has no choice but to agree to such terms. To use the extradition
problem as an argument against the death penalty, however, merely
obscures the issue. The addition of the death penalty option does not
require United States law enforcement officials to seek the death
penalty, it merely affords them the option of invoking the death
penalty.
Furthermore, there are many cases of terrorism in which the
death penalty can be utilized when extradition is not at issue. As
shown in the case of Fawaz Yunis, the Lebanese hijacker of a Royal
Jordanian airliner in Beirut in 1985, United States law enforcement
officials have the extraterritorial jurisdiction to apprehend terrorists
when possible.7 In that case, the Lebanese terrorist was lured
aboard a private yacht off the coast of Cyprus by a friend who
promises a drug deal and a party.77 Yunis's challenge to the asser-
tion of extraterritorial jurisdiction was dismissed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on Jan-
74. Id. at 183.
75. 135 CONG. REc. S14213-14 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy, D.
Massachusetts, and table of 20 countries with extradition treaties giving those countries the
right to refuse to extradite criminals unless the United States agrees to forego invoking the
death penalty).
76. See generally George, Federal Anti-Terrorist Legislation, in Bassiouni TERRORISM,
supra note 5, at 25 (detailing various criminal statutes affording federal law enforcement offi-
cials extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorist actions).
77. Friend Led Terror Suspect to FBI, Lawyer Says, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1987, at 3,
col. 3.
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uary 29, 1991. a The court found that Congress's decision to give
antiterrorism laws extraterritorial reach is justified by two jurisdic-
tional theories of international law. First, it is justified under the
"universal principle," whereby any state may prosecute terrorism re-
gardless of where it occurred because it is a crime of universal con-
cern. 79 Second, it is justified under the "passive personal principle,"
whereby a state may punish non-nationals for crimes committed
against its nationals outside of its territory when the state has a par-
ticularly strong interest in the crime."0
Yet, the critics rightly note that extradition is a serious problem
today. Indeed, even when the possibility of the death penalty is not
at issue, extradition is a thorny problem. For example, there is the
problem of Columbia's refusal to extradite drug kingpins to the
United States to face trial.81 Sovereignty concerns, political pressure,
and bold threats of violence sometimes force foreign countries to re-
fuse to extradite criminals to the United States. That is why I, along
with international leaders such as Prime Minister Manley of Ja-
maica and President Gaviria of Colombia, and distinguished interna-
tional law scholars, advocate the creation of an international crimi-
nal court. This court would be used to try violations of international
law, including international drug trafficking and international terror-
ism. 82 Last year, Congress passed, and the President signed into law,
an amendment I introduced to the 1991 Foreign Operations Appro-
priations Act. The amendment8 for the President to report to Con-
gress by October 1, 1991 the results of his efforts to establish an
international criminal court.84 The amendment also calls for the Ju-
dicial Conference of the United States to report to Congress by the
same date on the feasibility of an international criminal court and its
78. United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
79. 924 F.2d at 1091. See generally Blakesley, Jurisdictional Issues and Conflicts of
Jurisdiction, in Bassiouni, TERRORISM, supra note 5, at 131.
80. Id.
81. Although Colombia's Supreme Court had earlier halted all extraditions to the
United States on a technicality, Colombia's President resumed extraditing drug traffickers to
the United States after drug traffickers assassinated a Presidential candidate, Luis Carlos
Galan, in August 1989. Colombian Candidate Murdered; President Sets Moves Against Drug
Lords, Reinstates Extradition, Wash. Post, Aug. 20, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
82. See generally M.C. BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND
DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (1987); Bassiouni, Effective
National and International Action Against Organized Crime and Terrorist Criminal Activi-
ties, 4 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 9 (1990); Bassiouni, Critical Reflections of International and
National Control of Drugs, 18 DEN. J. INT'L L. POL. 311 (1990).
83. Amend. 3068 to H.R. 5114, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S16216-17
(daily ed. Oct. 19, 1990); Pub. L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat. 1979, 2066-67, § 599E (1990). The
President recently released his report. (Copy on file at the Dickinson Low Review office).
84. See id.
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proposed relationship to the federal judiciary.85
Problems of extraditing criminals are compounded when the
death penalty is a potential punishment. There is some evidence,
however, that even countries that have banned the death penalty will
extradite those who have allegedly committed heinous crimes, like
terrorism, without requiring an assurance that the death penalty will
not be used. Of course, in many of those situations, such individuals
are able to utilize domestic, and even international, court procedures
to challenge the decision not to invoke the treaty option. For exam-
ple, in the case of Charles Ng, who is charged with a series of grisly
slayings in Northern California, Canadian authorities decided not to
invoke their treaty option.8a Lawyers for Ng, however, unsuccessfully
sought a ruling from the Canadian Supreme Court that would re-
quire Canadian authorities to invoke their treaty option.8 7 By con-
trast, despite a similar provision in the United States 1978 extradi-
tion treaty with Mexico, Mexican authorities dispensed with
extradition proceedings and immediately deported Ramond Salcido.
Salcido was sought by California authorities for a 1989 rampage in
Redwood City, California, where he allegedly killed his wife, two
daughters, and four other people.88
In a far more troublesome case, Jans Soering, who was sought
by Virginia authorities on charges of the cruel murder of his girl-
friend's parents, fled to the United Kingdom. Although British offi-
cials sought and received an assurance from Virginia authorities that
the death penalty would not be used, Soering's lawyer's appealed to
the European Court of Human Rights. The court adopted the view
that long delays in habeas corpus appeals of death sentences in the
United States was itself violative of the European Convention on
Human Rights ban on inhuman or degrading treatment.8 9 Extradi-
tion was only permitted when the Virginia authorities dropped the
85. The Judicial Conference is currently studying the issue and has not yet released a
report on the international criminal court concept. Most recently, on March 14, 1991, the
Senate unanimously passed S. Res. 76, a resolution I introduced, to encourage the President to
confer with the sovereign state of Kuwait, countries of the Coalition allied against Iraq, or the
United Nations to establish an International Criminal Court or Military Tribunal to try Iraq's
President Saddam Hussein and other Iraqis responsible for war crimes, crimes against peace,
and crimes against humanity as defined under international law.
86. Murder Suspect's Bid to Stay in Canada Tests Pact, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1991, at
AI8, col. 1.
87. Id. See also Canada Sends U.S. a Murder Suspect, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1991, at
A15, col.l.
88. Id.
89. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1989); see generally Naldi, "Death Row
Phenomenon" Held Inhuman Treatment, 43 REv. OF THE INT'L COMM. OF JURISTS 60 (1980).
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capital murder charge.90
Although we should ensure that those countries which do choose
to extradite without assurances are rewarded, we must remember
that those foreign countries opposed to the death penalty are opposed
for sincere moral, religious, and ethical reasons. We must also re-
spect the court systems of other countries and the rights of defend-
ants to litigate these issues in those court systems. As such, the
United States must be sensitive to these concerns in order to remain
a successful actor on the world scene and not invite retaliation by
other countries. The problem of extradition, however, in no way un-
dermines the need for a death penalty for terrorists. Such a death
penalty would give federal prosecutors an added tool in prosecuting
terrorists. They can use it or, if a foreign country objects to extradi-
tion, they can agree not to seek the death penalty.
VI. Conclusion
For far too long we have allowed the terrorist menace to fester
without any coherent and sustained response. Five years ago, at a
February 1986 Senate Subcommittee hearing, I stated that "[a]l-
though we have had some tough talk on terrorism, we have had very
little tough action on terrorism . . . . Those words are as true
now as they were then. Attention and resources are often devoted to
terrorist issues only after a major terrorist incident, and are not usu-
ally sustained. The threat of terrorism unleashed by Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein and the heightened concern with security have once
again brought the issue of terrorism under public scrutiny. A terror-
ist death penalty will send a clear message to terrorists everywhere
that the United States will punish severely any action taken against
Americans, anywhere. Let us hope that this time we will not allow
the moment to pass without concrete action.
90. Naldi, supra note 89, at 62.
91. Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism: A Dilemma for Policymakers, Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (Feb. 19, 1986) (statement of Sen. Specter).

